WALSH v. THE PEOPLE.

will be solvable in treasury notes. And it is also held that the
legal tender acts are constitutional as applied to transactions since
their passage.
9. In Trebilock v. Wilson, it is decided that a debt created before
the passage of the legal tender aots, and solvable by express terms
"in specie," cannot be discharged by the tender of the nominal
amount due in treasury notes.
ISAAC S. SHARP,
Philadelphia.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of illinois.
WALSH v. THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS.
A proposal by an officer to receive a bribe, though not bribery, is an indictable
misdemeanor at common law.

THE defendant below was an alderman of the Common Council
of the city of Chicago. As such he was indicted for a proposal
made by himself to receive a bribe, to influence his action in the
lischarge of his duties.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THORNTON, J.-The indictment is in form an indictment at common law; and it is conceded that the statute has not created such
an offence against an alderman. Our criminal code has made it
an offence to propose or agree to receive a bribe on the part of
certain officers, but an alderman is not, either in terms or by construction, included amongst them: Rev. 1845, p. 167, sec. 87.
It is contended that the act charged does not fall within any of the
common law definitions of bribery; that no precedent can be found
for such an offence; and that as propositions to receive bribes have
probably often been made, and as no case can be found in .which
they were regarded as criminal, the conclusion must follow that
the offence charged is no offence. The weakness of the conclusion
is in the assumption of a premise which may or may not be true.
This particular phase of depravity may never before have beer
exhibited; and if it had been, a change might be so suddenly
made by an acceptance of the offer, and a concurrence of the parnes, as to constitute the offence of bribery, which consists in the

WALSH v. THE PEOPLE.

receiving any undue reward to incline the party to act contrary to
the known rules of honesty and integrity.
But the character of a particular offence cannot fiirly be deter
mined from the fact that an offence exactly analogous has not been
described in the books. We must test the criminality of the act
by known principles of law.
At common law, bribery is a grave and serious offence against
public justice, and the attempt or offer to bribe is likewise criminal.
A promise of money to a corporator to vote for a mayor of a
corporation was punishable at common law: Bex v. Plymton, 2
Lord Raym. 1377.
The attempt to bribe a privy counsellor to procure an office was
an offence at common law: Rex v. IFaughan, 4 Burr. 2494. In
that case Lord MANSFIELD said: "1Whenever it is a crime to take
it is a crime to give. They are reciprocal. And in many cases,
especially in bribery at elections to Parliament, the attempt is a
crime. It is complete on his side who offers it." Why is the
mere unsuccessful attempt to bribe criminal ? The officer refuses
to take the offered reward, and his integrity is untouched, his coduct uninfluenced by it. The reason for the law is plain: the
offer is a sore temptation to the weak or the depraved. It tands
to corrupt, and as the law abhors the least tendency to corruption,
it punishes the act which is calculated to debase, and which may
affect prejudicially the morals of the community. The attempt to
bribe is then at common law a misdemeanor, and the person making
the offer is liable to indictment and punishment. What are mis.
demeanors at common law? Wharton, in his work on Crimina
Law, p, 74, says: "Misdemeanors comprise all offences lower than
felonies which may be the subject of indictment. They are divided
into two classes: first, such as are mala in se, or penal at common
law: and secondly, such as are mala prolzibita,or penal by statute.
Whatever under the first class mischievously affects the person oz
property of another, or openly outrages decency, or disturbs public order, or is injurious to public morals, or is a breach of official
duty when done corruptly, is the subject of indictment."
In the case of the King v. Higgins, 2 East 5, the defendant was
indicted for soliciting and inciting a servant to steal his master's
chatteis. There was no proof of any overt act towards carrying
the intent into execution, and it was urged in behalf of the pris.
oner that the solicitation was a mere fruitless, ineffectual tempta,
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tion-a mere wish or desire. It was held by all the judges tha
the soliciting was a misdemeanor, though the indictment containeJ
no charge that the servant stole the goods, nor that any other aco
was done except the soliciting. Separate opinions were delivered
by all the judges. Lord KENYoN said: "The solicitation was an
act, and it would be a slander upon the law to suppose that such
an offence was not indictable." GROSE, J., said: "An attempt to
commit a misdemeanor was in itself a misdemeanor. The gist of
the offence is the indictment." LAWRENCE, J., said: "All offences
of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to the
prejudice of the community, are indictable, and that the mere
soliciting the servant to steal was an attempt or endeavor to commit a crime." LE BLANC, J., said: "That the inciting of another,
by whatever means it is attempted, is an act done; and if the act
is done with a criminal intent, it is punishable by indictment."
An attempt to commit an offence, or to solicit its commission, is at
common law punishable by indictment: 1 Haw. P. C. 55; Whart.
Cr. Law 78 and 872; 1 Russ. on Cr. 49. While we are not disposed to concur with Wharton to the full extent in the language
quoted, that every act which might be supposed, according to the
stern ethics of some persons, to be injurious to the public morals,
to be a misdemeanor, yet we are of opinion that it is a misdemeanor to propose to receive a bribe. It must be regarded as an
inciting to offer one, and a solicitation to commit an offence. This,
at common law, is a misdemeanor. Inciting another to the commission of any indictable offence, though without success, is a misdemeanor: 3 Chitty Cr. Law 994; 1 Russ on Or. 49; Cartwright's Case, Russ. & R. C. 0. 107, note b ; Bez v. Higgins, 2
East 5.
As we have seen, the mere offer to bribe, though it may be rejected, is an offence, and the party who makes the offer is amenable
to indictment and punishment. The offer amounts to no more
than a proposal to give a bribe; it is but a solicitation of a person
to take one. The distinction between an offer to bribe and a proposal to receive one, is exceedingly nice. The difference is wholly
ideal. If one man attempt to bribe an officer, and influence him
to his own degradation and to the detriment of the public, and
rail in his purpose, is he more guilty than the officer who is willing
to make sale of his integrity, debase himself, and who solicits to
be purchased, to induce a discharge of his duties ? The prejudi-

WALSH v. THE PEOPLE.

cial effects upon society are, at least, as great in the one case as in
the other; the tendency to corruption is as potent, and when the
officer makes the proposal he is not only degraded, but the public
service suffers thereby. According to the well established principles of the common law, the proposal to receive the bribe was an
act which tended to the prejudice of the community, greatly outraged public decency, was in the highest degree injurious to the
public morals, was a gross breach of official duty, and must therefore be regarded as a. misdemeanor for which the party is liable to
indictment.
It is an offence more serious and corrupting in its tendencies
than an ineffectual attempt to bribe. In the one case the officer
spurns the temptation and maintains his purity and integrity; in
the other, he manifests a depravity and dishonesty existing in himself, which, when developed by the proposal to take a bribe, if
done with a corrupt intent, should be punished, and it would be a
slander upon the law to suppose that such conduct cannot be
checked by appropriate punishment.
In holding that the act charged is indictable, we are not drifting
into judicial legislation, but are merely applying old and wellsettled principles to a new state of facts.
We are compelled, however, to reverse upon the evidence, and
shall not, therefore, further allude to the law of the case or to
the errors assigned upon instructions given and refused.
The defendant was found guilty upon the unsupported testimony
of one Goggin, and it appears that there were two persons of the
name of -Walsh, referred to by Goggin in his numerous conversations-one was a member of the Board of Education, and the
fther, the present defendant, was a member of the Common
Council of Chicago. After the date, as fixed by Goggin, of the
proposal on the part of the defendant to receive a bribe, Goggin
said to one Young, that he had agreed to give two thousand dollars
to Walsh, but that he now demanded' four thousand dollars,
Young replied, there are two persons of that name, "which one is
it ?" Goggin said, "It is Walsh of the board of education; the
alderman is a gentleman." Goggin complained to one Miller that
the defendant had prevented him from selling his lot to the city,
and said, "I will get a chance at 'him some of these days." He
also said to Donavan, "Walsh is my bitterest enemy, and I will
do everything m my power to send him up." To Cullerton, "I
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have nothing against any alderman but Jim Walsh, and by -,
11
I will fix him if swearing will do it." To Gustave Busse, " All
I
want is Walsh, the d-d
scoundrel, I want to go for him. If 1
can bring him to the penitentiary, I am going to do it." To Fred.
Busse, "There is only one man I want to go for-Walsh. If I
get on the stand if I don't fix him and get him in the penitentiary."
Upon cross-examination, Goggin denied all hostility, and any expressions of hostility towards the defendant, and he also denied the
conversation testified to by Young. We might make further reference to the evidence, but enough has been cited to show a deep
feeling of hostility on the part of the witness, towards the defendant,
and a determination to have him convicted if false swearing could
do it. We must credit the numerous witnesses who contradict the
prosecutor. He is therefore impeached, and to a great extent rendered unworthy of belief. He cannot have sworn to the truth, if we
believe the impeaching witnesses, or if upon the trial he testified
truly then he made wilfully false statements to divers persons
before the trial.
Not only is there reasonable doubt created as to the guilt of
of the accused, but the mind is forced to the conclusion that
the prosecution was the result of personal animosity, and was
carried on for the gratification of maliciotfs feeling. There is no
safety to the good, or virtuous or innocent, if convictions can be
had upon the testimony presented in this record. '
In a case involved in so much doubt the good character of the
accused, abundantly proved, was entitled to great weight. A
large number of witnesses testified that his general reputation for
honesty and integrity was good. Under all the circumstances it
is almost incredible that a verdict of guilty was obtained.
BREESE, J.-I concur in reversing the judgment, but I do not
concur in all the views presented in this opinion.
SCOTT, J.-I concur in reversing the judgment in this ease, but
dissent from the views expressed in the opinion of the majority of
the court.
There is no statute in this state which defines the offence for
which the plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted. It is a
common-law indictment, and it was sought to charge him with
having in his official capacity offered to receive a bribe. The in.
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dictment alleges that the plaintiff in error, "on the 1st day of
December 1871, then a member of the common council of the city
of Chicago, to wit, an alderman, did then and there unlawfully,
wickedly, corruptly, and contrary to his duty as such alderman,
propose to receive as a bribe of and from William Goggin, a large
sum of money, to wit, the sum of $4000, to induce him, the said
Walsh, as such alderman, to use his influence with favor as such
alderman, to induce and secure the purchase by said common
council, of said William Goggin, for said city of Chicago, for the
place whereon to erect a public school-house," certain real estate,
it being the duty of said common council to purchase real estate
for said city whereon to erect school-houses, contrary to law, &c.
The only question of any importance presented by the record is,
whether there is any such offence known to and indictable at common law as an offer by any officer to receive a bribe for his influence in his official capacity to induce his favorable action for
corrupt and improper purposes.
Bribery at common law is defined to be "the receiving or offering any undue reward by or to any person whatever, whose ordinary profession or business relates to the administration of public
justice, in order to influence his behavior in office, and incline him
to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity."
But in a more extended and enlarged sense it may be committed
by any person in an official situation, who shall corruptly use the
power and interest of his place for rewards or promises, and by
any person who shall give or offer or take a reward for offices of a
public nature: 3 Greenlf., sec. 71; 1 Russell on Crimes 154; 4 Bl.
Com. 139. In England the offence of taking bribes was punished
in inferior officers with fine and imprisonment; and in those who
offer a bribe, though not taken, the same: 4 B1. 140. It is said
the law abhors the least tendency to corruption, and upon the
principle that an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is itself a
misdemeanor, attempts to bribe public officers, though unsuccessful,
have been held to be criminal. The object was to preserve purity
in official conduct, and in the administration of justice; and the
tendency of the bribe being to corrupt official conduct and pervert
justice, he who received and he who offered the bribe were alike
punished. In no definition of bribery that I have seen does it
include a mere offer on the part of an officer to be himself bribed.
No reference has been made to any elementary work, or to any
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adjudged case that gives such a definition, and I am persuaded
that no such authority can be found. Bribery is punished on the
ground that it tends to produce official misconduct, or to corrupt
the adiinistration of justice. It is difficult to comprehend how a
mere offer on the part of an officer to receive a bribe could come
within the reason of the rule. A party who would express a
willingness to receive a bribe for his official influence is necessarily
corrupt, but no extrinsic motive is brought to bear on him by a
mere offer on his part, not accepted, other than his own evil inclinations which previously existed, and hence an offer to receive
a bribe does not come within any definition of bribery.
There is no such offence defined by our statutes.or the common
law as an offer on the part of an alderman to receive a bribe as
alleged, and the motion to quash the indictment ought to have
been allowed, and because it was not sustained I am of opinion
that the judgment ought to be reversed. I am unable to comprehend how a party may be indicted for an alleged crime wholly
unknown to the law, and on the trial be convicted of immoral conduct, even if it be admitted that such conduct tends to produce
official misconduct, and punished as bribery was punished at common law. It would certainly constitute an anomalous proceeding
in criminal jurisprudence. Nearly if not all of the misdemeanors
defined by common law writers, which it has been thought necessary to punish, have been defined in our criminal code, and
provision made for the summary punishment before justices of the
peace and by indictment, and in my judgment it is against the
policy of our laws to permit indictments for such offences not defined by statute.
Judgment reversed.
The foregoing case is one of such
novelty as fairly to justify its republication from the ChicagoLegal News. The
discussion of the question by Judge
THORNTON, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge SCOTT, have brought out the
law, pretty fully. There can be no
vuestion, that where the commission of
an act is a penal offence, the attempt to
commit it, when evidenced by any overt
act, will also be an offence: LEE, J., in
Bex v. Sutton, 2 Strange 1074. There
must, of course, be some overt act done

towards the commission of the offence;
mere intention is not sufficient. Hence
it was held at first, where no statute
existed, that having counterfeit coin in
possession, with intent to utter it as
good, is not indictable : Rex v. Stewart,
I Russ. & Ry. 288. But in a later case,
Rex v. Fuller, Id. 308, it was held, that,
procuring counterfeit coin with intent
to utter, was an offence, and that having
such coin in possession, unaccounted for,
and without any circumstance to inauce
a belief that the prisoner was the maker,
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which would constitute a distinct offence,

demand of the courts, in favor of that

was presumptive evidence of procuring
with intent to utter.
But where offences are defined by statute, as in most of the American states,
it raises a strong presumption against
treating acts as criminal, which are not
so defined in tile criminal code of the
state. And this is more especially so,
where such code assumes to define certain offences of the same character, omitting that in question. But notwithstanding all this, if tle common law of England has been adopted by such state, either expressly or by long acquiescence,
it is not without precedent, to maintain
indictments for offences as misdemeanors
at common law. But in such cases there
should be great watchfulness not to extend so convenient a net, beyond what
is clearly defined in the common law
precedents. There is nothing more clearly
of the essence of despotism, than to
hold crimes dependent upon the will of
the government, and the construction of
the courts. Where there is no landmark
or precedent to limit and define such
construction, it is scarcely more security
to the citizen or subject, titan the arbitrary will of the magistrate, and this is
not essentially any surer safeguard for
the liberty of the subject, than the will
of the executive, which is but a euphemism for despotinm. We are far from
saying that there is anything of thiq character deducible from the decision in this
case. It seems to be, upon the whole,
very emphatically in favor both of
:iberty and good morals. But it conies
very touch into the debatable ground of
--onstructive ofibnces, and there is great
demand for caution, wherever such questions are involved in the administration
of criminal justice. It would surely, in
tIhe present case, where the legislature
have defined the bribing, or attempting
to bribe, certain specified officers of tle
state, as punishable crimes, omitting the
office in question, not be an extravagant

certainty required in all criminal prosecutions and convictions, that they should
hold, that those cases were omitted purposely by the legislature. But we can
well conceive, that the disgusting nature of the offence charged, that a public
officer should solicit his own purchase ;
and especially the sensitiveness of the
public copscience upon that particular
point just at present, might plead very
loudly in favor of holding the alleged
offender for the commission of a crime,
if proved guilty, which from the nature
of the evidence seems not very certain to
occur. The fact, too, that the moral
guilt is much the same here, as in the
cases defined in the statute, will guaranty
the accused against suffering more than
his moral delinquency deserves.
But notwithstanding all these arguments, and many others, in favor of the
doctrine of the court in the principal
case, we must say, that it bears, in our
judgment, more the appearance of the
expression of righteous indignation
against a vile moral delinquency, than
that of a cautious conviction of a clearlydefined crime.
Misdemeanors, at common law, have
long been known (1) as offenecs against
public justice, as by hiring or intimidating witnesses to dikobey the process
of the court: -Pahis/lv. .In,tt, 21
Eng. Com. Law 483 ; State v. Kgj-:., 8
Vt. 57 ; (2) as offences against the publie health, as by selling unwholesome
provisions: .x
v. Dixon, 3 21. & S.
II; s. c. 4 Campb. 12; (3) offences
against public decency: 12 P'etdlI. Ab.
638. This offence of bribery, or attempt
at bribery, of public officers, may come
partly under both the first and last heads,
either as an offence against public justice or public decency, although the latter term has more specific reference to
slhockinggrossness, probably. In short,
to use the language of the text writers ;
"It seems to be an established rule, that
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whatever openly outrages decency, and
!s injurizas to public morals, is a mislemeanor at common law :" 12 Ptdff.
Ab. 628; 4 BI. Com. 65 u.; 1 Haw.
P. C., ch. 5, 4.
No doubt, these terms and many similar ones may be found in the reported
eases, sufficiently embracing, in a general
way, the offence charged against the
respondent. But the rule of law, as we
understand it, will not justify convicting
one of an offence, which in the opinion
of the court comes within these general
terms. Such a rule of creating criminal
offences in the hands of a corrupt judge,
or an unwise and inexperienced one,
might be made to cover almost any act
of one's life. The rule, of late certainly,
has been not to extend the rule of constructive misdemeanors at common law,
beyond what the precedents already indicated. It is admitted, there is no precedent for the present case. It is not like Rex
v. Vzughan, 4 Burr. 2494: an attempt to
bribe a privy counsellor to give one an
office ; nor is it like the case of an endeavor to bribe a judge: 2 East 14, 17, 22 ;
or like Young's Case: an attempt to influence a juryman in his verdict, cited 2
East 14, 16 ; or like Plympton's (!ase, 2
Ld. Ray. 1377 : an attempt to bribe a
mayor in his vote at the election of corporate officers.
* It may be said, indeed, that the
offence is very similar. And it may be,

in regard to its moral turpitude, even
more base than any of those defined in
the books. But it clearly is not the
same, and we maybe content to wait till
the legislature see fit to make a precedent
of it, since the law has confessedly not
yet done it. In criminal matters, especially, it is well for *the courts to wait
upon the legislature, and the existing
rules of law, rather than seem to go
beyond them, even for the accomplishment of some great good, in time of a
perilous crisis in the public sentiment.
These things will soon pass away, and
other times, and other men, probably,
supervene. How much better or wiser,
it is not needful to conjecture. We may
at least say, sufficient unto the day are
the ills we have. We need not, therefore, loosen our present moorings, and
fly to those we know not of, as may
truly be said of all departures, in the
administration of criminal jurisprudence,
from established precedent. The evil
of admitting constructive offences will
become appalling, we fear, when it is
too late to retreat. The offence charged
in this case seems to demand, for its redress, rather the impeachment and removal from office of the offender, than
his punishment without removal, and
that is the mode in which the law has
hitherto dealt with such offences, and it
seems every way the fittest and best.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
WASHINGTON SAVINGS BANK v. EKE.Y ET AL.
The alteration of a negotiable promissory note after its execution, by filling
blanks in a printed form, so as to make the note draw interest at a given rate
from date, avoids the note in the hands of an innocent holder for value who has
received the same in the usual course of trade, and before maturity.

THE condition of the note, the nature of the alteration, and all
the facts necessary to a correct understanding of the point actually
decided, appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
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J.-The only question presented by this record is,
whether the maker of a negotiable note is bound to pay the
same in the bands of an innocent holder who took a transfer
of the same for value before maturity, where such note, after
being executed, was altered so as to bear ten per cent. per
annum interest from the date, when it was the agreement of
the parties that it should bear no interest ? The note was for
fifty dollars, and was a printed form, filled up properly in all
the blanks except the spaces for the rate of interest and date
of interest were left blank, but with the express understanding that the note was to bear no interest. Notwithstanding
this was the agreement of the maker and payee, the payee, after
the execution and delivery of the note, and without the knowledge
or consent of the maker, altered the note by inserting in the spaces
left the words "ten" and "date," so as to make the note read ten
per cent. per annum from date. There was nothing on the face
of the note to indicate that it had been altered. That this was a
forgery and avoided the note in the hands of the payee, there
can be no dispute. The authorities are all agreed that such an
alteration of a written contract by a party to it, without the consent of the maker, renders it absolutely void. The only question
is, whether this rule applies to commercial paper purchased in the
usual course of trade by an innocent holder for value before
maturity.
There is much conflict in the authorities on this point, both in
England and America, so much so that it is useless to try to reconcile them, and I shall not undertake to review them here. The
tendency of the decisions of this court, is that such a forgery
avoids the note, not only as between the original parties, but as to
innocent holders for value. See Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245;
Haskell v. C1hampion, 30 Id. 136; Ivory v. Jllichael,33 Id. 398;
Presbury v. Michael, 33 Id. 542; Briggs v. Ewart, decided January term 1873.
I maintain that this rule is supported by the weight of reason,
i not of authority.
Why should the holder be allowed to recover on forged commercial paper ? It is urged that to prohibit a recovery in such
case would impede its circulation. But there need be no unnecessary delay created by this rule. In all cases the purchaser of
such paper must be satisfied that his endorser has the title. He
ADAMS,

WASHINGTON SAVINGS BANK v. EKEY.

ought also to satisfy himself that he is honest, or if not honest,
that he is a responsible indorser.
The endorser guarantees the genuineness of the paper, and if
the paper be forged, he is nevertheless responsible to endorser.
The insertion of the ten per cent. interest from date, was a complete forgery, and, in my opinion, rendered the note void in the
hands of the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
The above decision will doubtless be
read and scrutinized by business and
mercantile men throughout the whole
country. There is no subject in which
the business community is more deeply
interested than it is in preserving and
rendering commercial paper a safe and
convenient medium for the settlement
of balances between all classes of busiaess men. Such paper is transferred by
endorsement, or when endorsed in blank,
or made payable to bearer, it is transferable by mere delivery. It has heretofore been considered that any course of
judicial decision calculated to impede or
restrain the free and unembarrassed circulation of such paper was contrary to
the soundest principles of public policy.
Mercantile law is a system of jurisprudence acknowledged by all commercial
nations, and it is of vast importance that
there should be uniformity of decision
throughout the world. We, therefore,
propose to briefly examine the above
decision upon authority and principle,
and will first notice the authorities on
which the opinion is professedly based.
In the case o f Trigg v. Taylor, 27
MO. 245, the payee of the note altered
It so as to make a note for $500 read a
note for $1500. It was so skilfully done
that in the ordinary transactions of business it would not have been noticed.
But there was no question in the case in
regard to any blank space being negligently left in the note so as to offer facility
rorthi perpetrationof afraud. The court,
however, had occasion to comment on
the rule in such cases, and in doing so,

says: "If a blank is left for the amount
to be inserted, it may be said with some
propriety that the person signing the instrument may be considered as having
authorized it to be filled up with any
amount, and that it is proper that he,
rather than an innocent holder, should
suffer the consequence of any abuse of
his confidence ; but no such authority
can be presumed when the instrument is
complete, and the blanks entirely filled.
If, however, a bill, note or check is so
negligently drawn, with blank spaces
left for the addition of other words or
figures, that alterations can be made so
as not to excite suspicion, the loss ought
to fall on thd person in fault, according
to the familiar rule, that when one of
two persons must suffer by the act of a
third, the one who affords the means to
the wrongdoer must suffer the loss."
The court stated this principle, but as
there was no evidence in regard to any
blank space being left in the note by the
maker, and no instructions asked upon
this theory, there was no case for its
practical application.
In the case of ftrory v. Michael, 33 Mo.
398, the alterations consisted of filling a
blank with the words "thirty days" to
make the note read thirty days after late
I promise to pay," &c., and by adding
to the end of the note the words "bearing ten per cent. after maturity." The
court held, that the first alteration,
which was made by filling a blank, would
not avoid the note in the hands of an
innocent third party, and that the second
alteration was not made by filling any
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blank, but by adding to a note already
complete, words which materially
changed tile instrument. The court remarks, IIIt is true, as a principle of law,
that he who signs a note or bill with
blanks in it, and delivers it to another,
authorizes such other to fill the blanks;
but that principle cannot be invoked in
this case, except so far as to warrant the
insertion of the words "thirty days."
The insertion of the words "bearing
ten per cent. interest after maturity"
was not the filling of a blank, as the
note was a perfect instrument without
it ; but it was the adding of words to the
end of the note, materially changing the
terms of the contract by enlarging the
liability of the endorser." This same
principle was affirmed in the case of
Presburyv. Mfichael, 33 Mo. 542. There
was no question in regard to filling a
blank in a note in the case of Haskell v.
Champion, 30 Mo. 136, and the case of
Briggs v. Ewart (not yet reported) was
a case where the signature of the maker
was fraudulently obtained to a piece of
paper which he did not know was a note.
we cannot see in any of these cases sufficient ground for the statement in the
case under consideration, that " the
tendency of the decisions of this court
is, that such a forgery avoids the note,
not only as between the original parties, but as to innocent holders for
value."
This is the course of decision in Missonri. How is it elsewlere? The case
of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, was
where a customer of a banker delivered
to his wife printed checks, signed by
himself, with blanks for the sums to be
filled up by her. She caused them to be
filled up with the words fifty pounds, the
fifty being commenced with a small letter in tile middle of a line, and in this
condition she delivered the check, which
was afterwards altered by inserting in
the beginning of the line in which the
word fifty was written, the words three

hundred.

Tile banker paid the check

for three hundred and fifty pounds, and
it was held, the loss mitst fall on the

customer. This case was referred to ap.
provingly in the case of Tayllor v. Trigg,
supra, and in that of Wlorrall v. Glheen,
39 Penna. St. 388, and in Garrard v.
Haddan, 67 Penna. St. 82. where a note
was signed by the maker, leaving a

blank between the word "hundred" and
the word "dollars" which was filled up
by adding "and fifty" in such manner
that the alteration -was not readily noticeable, it was expressly held, that the
maker was liable to a holder for the
full amount, on the equitable ground
that he must suffer who by his negligence occasioned the loss.
In the case of Goodinan v. Simonds, 20
How. U. S. 343, the Supreme Court of
the United States says: "It may be
asserted, as a general principle, that
where a party to a negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note intrusts it to
the custody of another, when it is without date, whether it be for the purpose
to accommodate the person to whom it
was intrusted, or to be used for his own
benefit, tuch bill carries with it on its
face an implied authority to fill up th,

blank; and, as between such party tw
ttle bill or note and innocent third parties, the person to whom it we- so intrusted, must be deemed tlh agent of ti1e
party who so committed such bill or note
to his custody, and as acting under his

authority, and with his approbation."5
The same general principle is stated in
numerous cases: litchell v. Cdrer, 7
Cow. 37q and note; Androscoggin Bank
v. Kimball, 10 Cush. 373 ; Violet v. Patton, 5 Craunch 142; Russellv. Langgta~fe,
2 Doug. 514; Collis v. Einmet, I H.
Black. 313; Bank of Pittsburqh v. NVeal
et al., 22 How. U. S. 96; Smith v. [fy
coff, 3 Sandf. Chane. 77; Waterman v.
Fose et al., 43 Maine 504.
It was held in Visher v. ebster, 8
Cal. 109, that where a note is given
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with the rate of interest in blank, and
the holder inserts therein a sum for interest without the knowledge or consent
of the maker, it does not become thereby
void.
Parsons (2 Par. N. & B. 566) states
the principle as follows :-" If the note
have blanks left in it, filling them is no
alteration. But filling them contrary to
agreement or authority of the party who
left them is an alteration, which can
give the one who filled the blanks no
rights against him who left them, though
it may bind him who left them to other
holders for value."
The case of Putnam v. Sullivan, 4
Mass. 45, was where A. left his name
in blank with a clerk, to be delivered to
B. who was to write his note on the
other side, payable to A., and with it
take up another note on which A. was
likewise endorser. B. wrongfully ohtained the blank signature from the
clerk, and wrote his name on the reverse,
but instead of taking up the former note,
as intended, put it into general circulation. The court held, that A. could not
resist payment of the note in the hands
of a bondfide endorsee for value. This
case was referred to and approved in
Wade v. Witington, 1 Allen 561.
The facts stated in the opinion under
consideration, show that there was nothing on the face of the note to show it
had been altered; there was nothing to
evidence the agreement that the note was
n6t to draw interest. On the other hand
the maker of the note usea a printed form
wnich to complete would require the filling of the blanks so as to make the note
draw interest from date. It 'does not
appear whether the note was transferred
by endorsement or by mere delivery.
The court attaches much weight to the
consideration that the endorsee can look

to his endoi rser, but this argument would
have no appplication to a case where the
note was niade payable to bearer, and
transferred by delivery. We suppose
the court rendering this decision, would
say that, ii 1 such a case, the party receiving the same could investigate in
regard to its genuineness or require
security, anLdif this did not prove satisfactory, he could refuse to receive the
note. Of course he could, but what
effect woul d this requirement have on
commercial paper as a convenient way
of adjustin balances between parties so
situated as to render -such investigation
inexpedient 7 Instead of being a safe
medium of payment and adjustment, it
would be a fruitful source of fraud. The
value of e verything is represented by
money, an I money is represented by
bills of exci hange and negotiable promissory notes. Possession of money is all
the evidenc e of title which parties dealing in good *faith need look to, and to
make comm ercial paper an adequate repre'sentative of money, and make it subserve the purpose for which it was
brought int( general use, it must circulate, as nes rly as practicable, with the
same freedo m and safety to those who
receive it in good faith in the ordinary
course of b usiness, and the man who
places such a piece of paper in circulation, in a co ndition to enable a party with
whom he de als to easily perpetrate a fraua
on the busin ess community, ought to sufr
fer rather than, an innocent party. Ana
would it no t be better that such a person
should suffer the consequences of his
negligence, than to establish a rule whier.
will materiaIlly embarrass and endange,
the free andI safe circulation of commei
cial paper ?
H. B. JonNsox.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THOMAS D. MARSHALL v. HENRY KNOX

ET AL.

An assignee in bankruptcy cannot interfere with the possession of goods by the
,,fficer of a state court under an execution, or with the possession of any person
claiming either the absolute property or the right of possession to enforce a lien
Nor can such officer or person be brought within the jurisdiction of the Court
of Bankruptcy by summary process under rule to show cause. His r.gnts can
only be adjudicated in a plenary suit at law or in equity for that purpose
The attachments on mesne process which are dissolved by an adjudication of
bankruptcy are those which only become perfected liens by the judgment which
may ensue in them.
A writ of provisional seizure for rent, in Louisiana, is in the nature of an execution, and gives a lien on goods which is not discharged by a subsequent anjudication of bankruptcy of the tenant.
The sheriff under a writ of provisional seizure took a tenant's goods into possession for rent. Tenant then filed a petition and was adjudged a bankrupt. His
assignee took a rule on the sheriff and the lessor to deliver possession of the gooas,
and the Bankruptcy Court made the rule absolute, and refused to allow an appeal.
The lessor then filed a bill in the Circuit Court, and after sale of the goods by the
assignee, a supplemental bill, praying a review of the proceedings, an account
and damages.
Held, That the Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction to make the
rule ; that this was an original bill of which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction,
and that an appeal properly lay from the decree of the Circuit Court to this court.
The measure of damages is the full value of the goods and all the taxable costs
of the litigation, the whole however not to exceed the amount of rent due.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Louisiana.
Marshall, the appellant, being the owner of a plantation in
Avoyelles, Louisiana, leased it to Nathan G. Smith and Henry Fuller
for three years, from January 1st 1867. At the end of the first
year the tenants were in arrear $1400, and on January 4th 1868,
Marshall commenced an action therefor in the District Court of
the parish, and obtained a writ of provisional seizure (as it is
called), being the usual process by which a lessor takes possession
of his lessee's property found on the premises, for the purpose of
enforcing his lien thereon. This writ was served by the sheriff
on January 6th 1868, by serving a copy on the lessees, and by a
seizure of their property on the land, consisting of mules, wagons,
farming implem.ents, and stock, grain, furniture, &c., appraised
at $1744.
On January 15th 1868, Smith, one of the lessees, filed in the
District Court of the United States for Louisiana a petition to be
declared a bankrupt, and was declared such accordingly; and on
the 12th of February 1868, the defendants were appointed his
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assignees. Defendants obtained from the court a rule upon the
lessor (the complainant) and the sheriff to show cause why they
should not deliver up the property to the assignees, alleging that
various 'creditors of the bankrupt claimed to have a privilege on
the property, and that it was necessary for a proper adjustment of
all claims, privileges, and liens, that the possession should be surrendered to the assignees, to be subject to the bankrupt court.
The lessor contested this rule, stated his own rights and proceedings, and claimed possession of -the property through the sheriff,
for the purpose of selling the same to raise the amount of his
rent. The rule, however, was made absolute, without, so far as
appeared, any other proof on the subject. The lessor appealed,
but the district judge would not allow the appeal, and there was
no justice of this court at that time (April 1868), assigned to that
circuit to whom application could be made. The lessor thereupon
filed the present bill for an injunction to prohibit the assignees
from proceeding under the said order of the bankrupt court, and
from taking possession of said property, and for a decree that they
be directed to pursue any residuary interest of the bankrupt in
the lessor's suit in the District Court of the parish, and not molest
him in detaining and subjecting the property to the payment of
his rent, and for further relief. Failing to obtain a preliminary
injunction, and the property being taken and sold by the assignees,
the lessor filed a supplemental bill, complaining of the illegality of
the proceedings, asking for a review of the same, and for an account and damages. The bill and supplemental bill set out the
lease, the provisional seizure, the proceedings in the bankrupt
court, and the acts of the assignees; and complained that the
lessor was injured by a sacrifice of the property; and stated that
before filing the original bill he had offered the assignees a bond,
with sufficient sureties, to protect any persons claiming any superior
liens to his on the property, if any such there were, which, however, he denied.
The defendants, in their answer, alleged that the lessees had a
counter claim for repairs and permanent improvements, and that a
number of hands employed on the plantation had a privilege for
their wages superior to that of the les.-L r; but no proof of these
facts was offered in the case.
The principal allegations of the complainant were proved, and
the defendants on their part adduced rroof to show that they had
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acted in good faith under the orders of the bankrupt court, and
that they had sold the property fairly, and held the proceeds for
distribution, according to the rights of the parties in due course
of the bankruptcy proceedings.
On hearing, the bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
whereupon complainant took this appeal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-(After stating the facts.)
The first question is, whether this decree was rightly made, and
it is to be solved by reference to the second section of the bankrupt act. By this section it is declared that the Circuit Courts
"shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases
and questions arising under this act; and, except when special
provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition, or other
proper process, of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the
case as in a court of equity." By a subsequent clause of the
same section it is declared that said courts "shal l -have concurrent
jurisdiction with the District Courts * *
of all suits at law or
in equity * * by the assignee against any person claiming an
adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching
any property, or rights of property, of said bankrupt, transferable
to or vested in such assignee."
The first clause confers upon the Circuit Courts that supervisory
jurisdiction which may be exercised in a summary manner, in
term or vacation, in court or at chambers, and upon the exercise
of which this court has decided that it has no appellate jurisdiction: Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 65.
The second clause confers jurisdiction by regular suit, either at
law or in equity, in the cases specified; that is, in controversies
between the assignee and persons claiming an adverse interest,
touching any property of the bankrupt.
The present case is in form a regular bill in equity; but it also
asks a revision of the action of the District Court in the premises.
As an original bill in equity it cannot stand, if the District Court
had jurisdiction to proceed as it did; for the matter was already
decided in that court. As a bill to review the proceedings and
decision of the District Court, it was a very proper proceeding, and
ought to have been entertained by the Circuit Court. The revisory
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court may be exercised by bill as well
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as by petition; and as this bill complains of the action of the
District Court, and asks for a review and reversal thereof, the
Circuit Court erred in dismissing it for want of jurisdiction. But
regarded as a bill of review, we could not, according to our decision
in .3forganv. Thornhill, entertain an appeal from the decision of
the circuit court in the case.
The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed, unless it can be shown
that the District Court proceeded without jurisdiction. If this
were the case, then the bill may be regarded as an original bill, of
which the Circuit Court clearly had jurisdiction, and the appeal to
this court was properly taken.
The case here, then, depends on the question whether the
District Court had jurisdiction to proceed by rule as it did. The
goods, it has been seen, were in the custody of the sheriff, under
a writ of provisional seizure, and held as a pledge for the rent of
the lessor. The seizure had been made before the bankruptcy.
The landlord claimed the right thus to hold possession of them
until his claim for rent was satisfied. - This claim was adverse to
that of the assignee. The case presented was one of conflicting
claims to the possession of goods ; and the sheriff had present possession for the benefit of the lessor. Neither the sheriff nor the
lessor was a party to the proceedings in. bankruptcy. No process
had been served upon them to make them such. They were not
before the court; and the court had no control or jurisdiction over
them.
Under these circumstances the assignees applied for and obtained
from the District Court, a rule on the lessor and sheriff to deliver
the goods to them. -Had the court authority to make such a rule?
Could such a rule be characterized as due process of law?
The bankrupt law does not distinguish in what cases the District
Court may proceed summarily, and in what cases by plenary suit:
and we are left tc decide the question on the general principles
that affect the case. The second section, however, in conferring
jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts, uses this language: "Said
Circuit Courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the
District Courts of the same district of all suits at law or in equity,
which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy
against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person
against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property
of said bankrupt." This language seems to indicate that where
Vol.. XXI.-41
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there is a claim to an adverse interest in the property, a suit at
law or in equity will be the mode of redress properly resorted to.
The eighth section, in granting appeals and writs of error from the
district to the circuit court, only does so in cases in equity and at
law, and in cases where the claim of a creditor is allowed or rejected. If, therefore, adverse claims to property could be decided
by the summary action of the District Court, not only would the
party claiming adversely to the assignee be deprived of a trial by
due process of law, but he would be without appeal. An appeal
was in fact denied in this case.
We think that it could not have been the intention of Congress
thus to deprive parties claiming property, of which they were in
possession, of the usual processes of the law in defence of their
rights.
The subject, in one of its aspects, came before this court in the
case of Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419. In that case the adverse
claim was to the absolute property of the fund in dispute; not, as
in this, to a mere lien, and to possession by way of pledge under
the lien; and we held that the bankrupt court could not, by a
mere rule, make the adverse claimant a party to the bankruptcy
proceedings and adjudge his right in a summary way, but that the
assignee must litigate the claim in a plenary suit, either at law or
in equity. But it may, with some plausibility, be said that, as the
property in this case is conceded to be in the bankrupt, and the
question has respect only to the right of possession under the lien,
the District Court, which has express jurisdiction of the "ascertainment and liquidation of the liens and other specific claims"
on the bankrupt's property, might properly assume control of the
property itself. The claim, however, is to the right of possession,
and that right may be just as absolute and just as essential to the
interests of the claimant as the right of property in the thing
itself, and is, in fact, a species of property in the thing just as
much the subject of litigation as the thing itself. It is the opinion
of the court, therefore, that the case is not substantially different
from that of Smith v. Mason. Besides, it has another point, in
common with that case, upon which a direct adjudication was made
therein. The lessor in this case was not a party to the bankrupt
proceeding; and in Smith v. Mason we held expressly that "strangers to the proceedings in bankruptcy, not served with process,
and who have not voluntarily appeared and become parties to such
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litigation, cannot be compelled to come into court under a petition
for a rule to show cause."
The court is of opinion, therefore, that the District Court proceeded without jurisdiction in compelling the lessor and the sheriff,
under a rule to show cause, to deliver up possession of the goods
in question to the assignees. It results that the bill in this case
was properly filed as an original bill, and on that account should
not have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The case
should have been heard and decided upon the merits.
We are then brought to the question of merits. If the complainant had no right to hold the goods, notwithstanding his claim
to hold them, in an action at law against the assignee he could
have recovered only nominal damages; and, coming into a court
of equity for redress, and praying for an account of the value of the
goods, and for damages, if it turn out that he had no right to withhold the goods from the possession of the assignee, the court would
be very reluctant to compel the latter to place the value of the
goods in his hands to be relitigated in another suit. A court of
equity having got possession of the case by the lessor's own act,
must proceed to decide the whole merits of the controversy.
But we think it very clear that the complainant had a right to
the possession which he claimed. The fourteenth section of the
bankrupt act, it is true, vests in the assignees all the property and
estate of the bankrupt, " although the same is then attached on
mesne process as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve
any such attachment made within four months next preceding the
commencement of such proceedings." But this clause evidently
refers to those cases of original process of attachment, which only
become perfected liens by the judgment which may ensue. The
lessor's lien for rent on the goods of his tenant situate on the premises is one of the stTongest and most favored in the law of Louisiana. The articles nf the civil code use the following language:
"The lessor has for the payment of his rent and other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on the movable effects of the
lessee, which are found on the property leased." Art. 2675.
"In the exercise of this right the lessor may seize the objects
which are the subject of it before the lessee takes them away, or
within fifteen days after they are taken away, if they continue to
be the property of the lessee, and can be identified." Art. 2679.
"The right which the lessor has over the products of the estate,

MARSHALL v. KNOX.

and on the movables which are found on the place leasea *for his
rent, is of a higher nature than mere privilege. The latter is
only enforced on the price arising from the sale of movables to
which it applies. It does not enable the creditor to take or keep
the effects themselves specially. The lessor, on the contrary, may
take the effects themselves and retain them until he is paid."
Art. 3185.
When the rent accrues, or even before it is due, if the lessor
apprehends that the goods may be removed, he may have a writ
of provisional seizure to the sheriff, who, by virtue thereof, takes
possession of the goods and sells them in due course, as soon as
the court has recognised the amount of rent for which they are
liable.
Such a case is similar to that of an execution, in reference to
which it has been properly held that where the levy is made before
the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, the possession
of the officer cannot be disturbed by the assignee. Thu latter, in
such case, is only entitled to such residue as may remain in the
sheriff's hands after the debt for which the execution issued has
been satisfied. Such, we think, were the relative rights of the
parties in this case. If the assignee apprehended that the sheriff
would, by delay or negligence, waste the goods in his hands, he
could either apply to the District Court of the parish for redress
or aid in the premises, or perhaps file a bill in equity in the Circuit or District Court of the United States.
The next question is, what relief ought to be given to the complainant ?
The goods have been sold by the assignees. They cannot be
returned in specie. The supplemental bill prays that the assignees
be decreed to account to the complainant for the full value of the
property, and also such sum of money as he might be entitled to
receive by reason of the wrongful acts of the assignees in the
premises, and for further relief. The bill, it must be remembered.
was originally filed for an injunction to prevent the assignees from
disturbing the complainant in his possession of the goods. ie
was not in laches in defeniing his rights. He is clearly entitled.
under the circumstances of the case, to the full value of these
goods, clear of all expenses, whether the assignees realized that
value or not (limited, of course, by the amount of rent which he
is entitled to be paid); and also to all the taxable costs to which
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be has been put by this litigation. As to any damages beyond
that, if he has suffered any, we think that he ought not to recover
them in this suit, as he, or the sheriff for his benefit, had an option
to bring "anaction of trespass for damages, instead of resorting
to a court of equity for relief. Damages are allowed, it is true,
in certain cases, as incidental to other relief; but even if they
could, in strictness, be awarded in this suit, we do not think that
the case is such as to call for the interposition of the court in
directing an inquiry as to damages.
The decree must be reversed, with directions to the court below
to proceed in the cause in conformity with this opinion.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
J.M. HUDSON FT AL. V. S. Y. BINGHAM ET AL.
A discharge under the Bankrupt Act of 1867, by a Bankruptcy Court having
jurisdiction, when properly pleaded in bar to a suit in a state court, whether of law
or equity, is conclusive, and cannot be attacked for fraud in obtaining it.
A material fact in a suit either at law or in equity cannot be put in issue by a
notice that it will be contested at the trial ; it must be regularly pleaded.

Tmis was a bill in equity, filed by complainants, as creditors of S. Y.
Bingham, seeking to set aside two deeds conveying tracts of land to
defendant, Harris, on the ground that they were made to hinder and
delay the creditors of Bingham, and were therefore fraudulent and
void. The defendants answered, denying all fraud, and insisting on the
bonafides of these conveyances. In addition to this denial, Bingham,

in his answer, set up as a defence to a recovery on the debts sought to
be enforced, his discharge in bankruptcy, granted by the District Court
of the United States for West Tennessee.
This answer was filed June 8th 1871, and on December 12th 1871,
complainants caused a notice to be served on said Bingham, and filed in
the cause, that on the hearing in the Chancery Court at Huntingdon,
the complainants would insist that the- discharge in bankruptcy was
invalid, by reason of a fraudulent withholding of a true statement of
the property and assets of said Bingham, from the schedule required to
be filed by him with his petition for bankruptcy, and other acts specified in the Act of Congress, which might have been urged as a reason
for withholding said discharge in the District Court, or for annulling
said discharge within two years after its date, on proper proceedings, as
required by the Bankrupt Law of 1867.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FREEMAN, J.-Before proceeding to discuss the main questin debated so earnestly before us, it is proper to say that we know of no rule

HUDSON v. BINGHAM.

of law, or of practice or pleading in our state by which a materiai
fact involved in the decision of a case in the Chaneery Court, can be
put in issue upon a notice given to a party, that such fact will be contested on the hearing of the cause. The defendant had presented his
defence to the decree sought against him, in his answer, and had tendered therewith the evidence of such defence, complete in form, and
primndfacie conclusive in his favor in any aspect of the question-in
the form of the record of a decree made by a court of competent and
even of exclusive jurisdiction to adjudge the matters purporting to
have been adjudged by that decree. We need but say that the notice
referred to can be of no importance in this case, as it is not a pleading,
and on its allegation no issue has been or could be made.
The case, then, presents the simple question as to whether, when a
defendant presents by way of defence to a demand sought to be enforced against him, in a state court, the plea of a formal discharge in
bankruptcy, the complainant in a case in the Chancery Court can defeat
the conclusive effect of the adjudication in the bankrupt proceedings,
by showing by proof that there was a violation of the requirements of
the Bankrupt Act of 1867, in withholding a full statement of his property in his schedule required to be furnished by the act with his petition, or for any of the causes set down in said act. It will be seen, by
this statement of the question, that we must look to the proof, and not
to any allegations of any pleadings, to see what the ground of attack on
the validity of this judgment is-not a very satisfactory mode of investigating the question, to say the least of it.
Waiving these matters, however, we proceed to examine the question
pressed on our attention by counsel. We may say that a majority of
the court have in at least two cases, one at Knoxville and the other at
Nashville, within the last twelve months, adjudged the question presented, and laid down the rule that the discharge of a bankrupt could
not be attacked collaterally in a state court for the cause referred to;
but inasmuch as the case is earnestly pressed on us, we review the question, premising that after two adjudications of the question in which it
vas seriously investigated, we ought not only to be convinced that our
former views were erroneous, but that they were clearly so injurious
to the rights of parties and detrimental to sound policy, that the rule
should be changed, before we can consent to overrule our own decisions.
In order to a proper understanding of the question involved, it is proper to ascertain with some distinctness what is the nature and character
of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and what are the matters involved in
such a suit, and what the character of the jurisdiction exercised in such
proceeding by the District Court of the United States. It is obvious
that the proceeding is one of peculiar character, having in it elements
not found in the ordinary proceedings of our courts, either state or
federal. The character of this proceeding may be perhaps better seen
by considering the general purpose of the law in connection with the
precise provisions of the Act of Congress for the carrying out of that
purpose. As said by Mr. Bump, p. 172, the best author we have on
this subject at present, "The great object of all bankrupt or insolvent
laws is to distribute the property of a debtor, who is unable to pay his
debts in full, among his creditors (and we may add among all his creditors), by judicial proceedings in which all may be heard, and to discharge
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his property afterwards, or at least his person, from the debts owed by
him at the time of the institution of such proceedings."
The Bank.
rupt Law of 1867 evidently contemplates this, and we may sum up its
purpose as shown by its various provisions, to be what the certificate o4.
discharge-on its face purpQrts it to be, as prescribed by the 23d. section of
the act, a decree or judgment of the court that the party "be for ever
discharged from all debts and claims which by said act are made
provable against his estate, and which existed on the day the petition
for adjudication was filed." In other words, taking the Bankrupt Law
of 1867 in its full scope, the proceeding under it is a suit by the party
petitioning (where it is a case of voluntary bankruptcy), against all his
creditors, with certain exceptions named in the act, in which the petitioner seeks, by the judgment of the District Court of the United
States, to be for ever discharged from all his debts, which are provable
against his estate by the provisions of the law of Congress, and which
exist at the time of filing his petition. This is the plain and welldefined object of the proceeding, and all the regulations prescribed in
the statute for the conduct of the suit thus commenced are intended
to effectuate this end, and at the same time give sucl creditors who are
to be defendants to this suit ample means of proving their claims, and
sharing in the final disposition of the estate of the bankruptpro rata,
according to the amount of their debts. In order to carry out the purpose of the law, it is provided that the petitioner shall annex to his
petition a schedule or oath, containing a full and true statement of all
his debts, and as far as possible to whom due, with the place of residence -of each creditor, if known to the debtor, and the sum due from
him-in a word, a full list of the parties against whom the suit is
brought, as far as practicable : Sect. 11, Act of 1867.
It will be seen, however, from this and other prdvisions, that absolute
accuracy in this matter is not required, for it is to be done as far as
practicable. Notice of the filing of this application or petition is to
be published in such newspaper as may be designated, and the marshal
is under an order provided for "to serve written or printed notice, by
mail or personally, on all creditors upon the schedule filed with the
petition, or whose name may be given to him in addition by the debtor,
which notice shall specify, among other things, the issuing of the
warrant in bankruptcy against the estate of the bankrupt, and that a
meeting of the creditors, giving name and residence and amounts, so
far as known, to prove their debts, and choose an assignee of the estate,
will be held at a time fixed in the notice. These provisions show the
character of the proceeding to be such as we have indicated, and that
all the creditors, so far as known, are to be made parties by actual
notice, and, as we think, the publication in the newspaper was clearly
intended to apply to those not known, or whose residence was not
unown. This being the character of the proceeding, the judgment of
discharge by its terms is an adjudication of the question involved in the
suit, and is between the petitioner and all the defendants, his crediters,
a decree binding and conclusive on all who are made parties in accordance with the provisions of the act; or, in the language of the decree
of discharge, is an adjudication that "bbe is discharged from all debts
and claims which by said act are made provable against his estate,
which existed at the commencement of the suit." In this view of the
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question, upon a principle of universal recognition, the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of all matters adjudged abetween parties to that suit, and cannot be collaterally attacked or
questioned before any other tribunal. We need cite no authority for
this proposition. It is axiomatic. This being so, it follows that, unless
the complainants can show that they are excepted from the operation
of this rule by some well-settled principle of law, the decree of bankruptcy is and must be conclusive as to them as to their debt, it being
in existence at the commencement of the bankrupt suit, and a debt
provable under said proceedings. This view would seem conclusive of
the question on principle, but the case is still stronger. Under the
Bankrupt Law of 1841,-which, in its general features, was precisely
the same as that of 1867-it was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Shawhan v. IVAerritt, 7 How. 331 : "The
public notice required by the act to be given having been made, the
creditors must be treated as having notice of the proceedings, and an
opportunity to make objections to them, and having neglected or refused
so to do, they ought not to be allowed to impeach them collaterally, as
they are in the nature of proceedings in ren before a court of record
having jurisdiction. This being so, it is well settled that in a proceeding i n rem, or in its nature, the decree is conclusive against all parties
having the right under the proceeding to control the decree. This is a
universal principle, with no exception, so far as we have been able to
see. If this be the correct view of the question-and being by the
Supreme Court of the United States it is conclusive on us-then the
question before us does not admit of doubt, and the decree in bankruptcy is conclusive as against a collateral attack on it. We are aware
that several state courts, among them our own, held, under the Act of
1841, in construing the clause as to the effect of the discharge, making it
subject to attack in our courts, that it might be avoided by showing
fraudulent concealment of property. We doubt very much the correctness of that view under that act. Itsuffices to say, that it was never
%oheld by the Supreme Court of the United States ; and the principle
laid down in the above case would indicate that no such doctrine would
have been maintained by that court had the question been brought
before it. However, the language of the clause as to the effect of the
discharge, in the Act of 1841 and 1867, is entirely different, and does
not admit of the same construction, as we shall show in an afterpart of
this opinion.
In addition to the above, however, the conclusive effect, on general
principles, of such a decree is strengthened by the fact of the jurisdiction exercised by the Federal court, and the exclusive control which the
Federal government has over this peculiar question of bankruptcy.
Sect. 8 of article 1 of Constitution of United States, in defining the
legislative power of the Federal government is, among other things,
"The Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout
the United States." Since the great leading case of Sturgis v.
Crowniagsdeld, 4 Wh. 122, decided in 1819, and the opinion
oi MARSHALL, Chief Justice, in that case, it has been settled
with almost perfect unanimity, that this power is so far exclusive
in the Federal government, that when exercised by the passage of a
law regulating bankruptcies, it is inconsistent and incompatible with
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the exercise of a similar power by the states. In pursuance of this
view, it is settled beyond dispute, by an overruling weight of adjudication, both state and Federal, that the moment a bankrupt law of the
United States goes into operation, all state insolvent laws, become inoperative and are suspended: See case of Reynoids, 8 R. I. 485, where the
cases on this question are cited. This being so, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States over the whole question
of bankruptcy, is exclusive, as being the exercise of a power granted to
the Federal government alone, and the administration of a remedy given
or suit brought in pursuance of, and under a statute of the United States,
which no state court can be called on to administer, and over which it
has no control. The power conferred by the Constitution on Congress
on the subject of bankruptcy, has been exercised by that body in the
passage of the Act of 1867, and the machinery for carrying out its purpose has been confided exclusively by Congress to the courts of its own
government, as was proper should be done. In this view of the case,
to hold that the decree of courts having this exclusive jurisdiction
could be set aside by a collateral attack on them, and proof of matters,
which if shown in the suit in those courts would have prevented the
decree from being rendered, would be so far in violation of all principle,
that we opine no judicial mind would entertain it as a serious proposition for a single moment. To the state court this decree of the Federal
courts stands as the decree of a tribunal having complete and exclusive
jurisdiction over the whole question to settle and adjudge all matters
involved in the proceeding, and unless void on its face it can never be
attacked or disregarded. In such cases the regularity of the proceedings is presumed, jurisdiction confers the power to render the judgment,
and no irregularity in the forms of proceeding will affect its validity,
and it is binding until set aside in the court in which it was rendered:
Dolson v. Pierce, 12 New York 156; .Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 Id.
535, and cases cited. This being so, and in connection with the
other principles we have laid down, it is beyond question, that the decree of the District Court is conclusive on general principles, unless the
power is given to a state court by the act itself to declare it inconclusive
and void, or unless by the law of Congress, it is not made conclusive in its
effect, as in case of other decrees and judgments of courts of general
jurisdiction.
We proceed now to examine the law of Congress itself, to see what
is the effect of this discharge in bankruptcy by its provisions ? It
must be remembered that the law of Congress is directed to the action
of the Federal courts, contemplates proceedings in them, and prescribes
the mode of their action exclusively. That Congress by virtue of its
exclusive control over the whole question, has the power to declare the
effect of the discharge which shall be granted by the decree of its courts,
is not questioned by any one. We turn to the language of the law
to see what that effect is, as declared by the Federal legislature which
enacted the law : By sect. 34 of the act of 1867, it is provided: "that a
discharge duly granted under this act, shall, with the exceptions aforesaid, release the bankrupt from all debts, claims, liabilities and demands
which were or might have been proved against his estate in bankruptcy,
and may be pleaded by a simple averment, that on the day of its date,
such discharge was granted to him, setting the same forth in 1hnc verba
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as a full and complete bar to all suits brought on any such debts, claims,
liabilities or demands, and the certificate shall be conclusive evidence
in favor of such bankrupt of the fact and the regularity of such discharge," that is, that the decree has been rendered, and the proceedings were regularly conducted. This portion of the section admits of
but one construction, and makes the discharge in accordance with general provisions of law, conclusive as in other judgments and decrees of
courts of competent jurisdiction. It applies to the effect of this discharge in any and all courts, where the party may be sued or impleaded
to recover and enforce such debts, for it provides how it shall be
pleaded in defence to such suits, and its effect in such cases, where the
claims are sought to be enforced by such a suit. This feature of this
clause we think has been overlooked generally in the discussion we
have seen as to the effect of the discharge; that is, the fact that this
clause applies specifically to the effect that shall be given to the discharge by any and all courts in which suits should be brought to enforce
any debts which were or might have been proved against the estate of
the bankrupt in the bankruptcy suit. It makes the discharge conclusive as a plea in all such cases, if language can do so, and to this effect
in such suits there is no exceptionable provision in the statute. Then
follows a proviso, however, for the benefit of such creditors, in this language: " Alwaysprovided, that any creditor or creditors of said bankrupt, &c., who shall see fit to contest the validity of said discharge, on
the ground that it was fraudulently obtained, may at any time within
two years after the date thereof, apply to the court which granted it, to
set aside and annul the same." It then goes on to regulate the mode of
procedure in such cases, and what judgment shall be rendered by the
court. It further provides, that if the fraudulent acts alleged are not
proved, or if the court shall find that they were known to the creditor
before the discharge granted, the judgment shall be rendered in favor
of the bankrupt, and the validity of his discharge shall not be affected.
Here is a mode of attacking the validity of a discharge and having it
annulled, provided by the act itself, by which the previous conclusive
effcct of the discharge, given by the first part of the section, is or may be
avoided. It is not provided, however, as we are called on to decide here,
that notwithstanding this conclusive effect, provided for, it nevertheless
may be shown to have been fraudulently obtained in all cases when interposed by plea in accordance with the statute, nor that this may be
shown by proof to avoid the conclusive effect of such discharge. That
this was not intended to be done is strengthened by the fhct that the
Congress of the United States had passed several similar laws before
this, which had been administered and construed by the courts of the
eountry. The last, passed in 1841, had a provision that was in precise
accord with the views maintained by counsel in this case. It was as
follows : " Such discharge, when duly granted, shall in all courts of
justice, be deemed a full and complete discharge of all debts, &c.,
which are provable under this act, and shall and may be pleaded as
full and complete bar to all suits brought in any court or judicature
whatever, and the same shall be conclusive evidence of itself in fhvor
of such bankrupt. unless the same shall be impeached for some fraud or
wilful concealment by him of his property, &C., contrary to the provisions of this act." The proviso here is for impeaching it in all courts,
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or was so construed, but in Act of 1867 is for annulling it only by the
proceoaing there given. This provision is entirely different in its terms
and purpose from the Act of 1867, and unless we hold that the latter
act by the use of different language, definitely and clearly expressing a
contrary purpose, intended to provide for the same thing as the Act of
1841, we must conclude no such effect was intended, as contended for
in this case. The debates in Congress show, we believe, that the purpose was as we have construed it, and to establish a different rule from
that of the Act of 1841.
Several other sections of the Bankrupt Law are referred to, however, as sustaining the views contended for, some of which we notice.
1st. The 21st section is urged, which in the first clause, only provides that no creditor proving his debt or claim, shall be allowed to
maintain any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, but
shall be deemed to have waived all right of action, &c. Without critically examining this clause, we need but say, that, taken in connection
with the balance of the section, it has no application whatever to the
effect of a discharge, but only to the right to prosecute or bring suits
against the bankrupt during the pendency of the bankrupt proceedings, as is shown by subsequent parts of the section providing for such
suits being continued by leave of the Bankrupt Court to the point
of a judgment, and then the debt proven against the bankrupt's estate.
The construction contended for by the counsel would involve the
absurd conclusion, that the whole effect of the bankrupt proceedings
might be avoided at the option of any and every creditor, by a simple
refusal to prove his debt. If this was the true construction of the law,
then it would render its provisions entirely nugatory, for no creditor
under such circumstances would ever come in, but only wait and take
his chances by diligence to secure his own debt in his own way, and not
to share in distribution of assets of his creditor pro rata with all his.
other creditors. Such would be the result of the proposition of counsel in
this case which is, "that a creditor who has not proven his debt may
bring his suit in any court of law or equity, notwithstanding the discharge granted, the section applies only to the bringing or prosecuting
suits pending the proceedings, any one may bring suits after the discharge, and the law does not interfere to prevent it, and he may have
a judgment, if the bankrupt chooses to waive the benefit of his discharge,
and not interpose it for his protection. But if he pleads it, then the
law says it shall be a complete bar to all suits brought on such debts as
"1were proven or might have been proven against the bankrupt's estate."
We may dispose of these arguments by reference to the general provisions of sect. 29, which furnish the strongest support to the views maintained. This section is the one which provides for granting the discharge, fixes the time when it shall be granted, the notice to be given
to creditors, and the terms on which the court shall grant it. It provides alone for the action of the District Court in proceeding in bankruptcy, and has no reference to suits brought after the discharge, or
suits to enforce claims, which were proven or might have been proven
against the estate-as sect. 34 does. It says to the Bankrupt Court, no
discharge shall be granted, or if granted valid, in certain cases, or on
certain fhcts being shown to said court, and in conclusion of the section,
requires the bankrupt to take an oath, that he has not done or been
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privy to any act, matter or thing specified in this act as a ground for
withholding the discharge, or as invalidating it, if granted. The next
section 30, provides that no person shall be granted a discharge, whe
had previously been discharged under this act, except under certain
conditions.
The 31st section then provides for any creditor opposing the discharge, filing his specifications in writing of tl e grounds of his opposition, and for the court ordering any question of Iact so presented to be
tried at any session of the court. The 32d section then enacts that if it
shall appear to the court that the bankrupt has in all things conformed
to his duty under the act, and that he is entitled to receive his discharge from all his debts, with the exceptions specified, the court shail
grant him the certificate which is provided for, and which we have
quoted. It is obvious from this summary of the sections and their
provisions, that they are all intended to be brought into operation, and
bear on the question of granting the discharge by the court, and provide for proceedings to be had before the same is granted. Then follows
after the form of the discharge, the provision section 33, exempting
certain debts from the effect of the discharge so granted; and then the
section which we have before quoted and commented on, as to the conclusive effect of the discharge in eases where suits are brought on debts
proven or provable, and the proviso, giving the only means of defeating
or avoiding this conclusive bar, thus provided by the state, against such
suits. This proviso contains the only provision of the law of Congress
by which this conclusive effect is to be prevented on such debts, and
that is by having the decree granting it annulled and set aside on proceedings regularly instituted for the purpose, within two years from the
time of granting it. It will be further seen from the language of the
section immediately preceding the discharge, that the court is required
to then adjudicate the question, as to whether the bankrupt has in all
things conformed to his duty under this act. and in view of this investigation is entitled to his discharge. In addition the discharge itself
recites the fact on its face, that the party has been duly adjudged a
bankrupt, and appears to have conformed to all the requirements of law
in that behalf, and therefore it is ordered by the court that lie be for
ever discharged from all debts, &c. So that it appears clearly that the
act contemplates all these facts to have been investigated and adjudged
by the discharge. This would have been conclusive on all creditors
having proven, or who had provable debts, on general principles ; therefore the subsequent section removes this difficulty by defining the effect
of this discharge. and providing how it may be defeated by proceeding
instituted for the purpose within two years This, it seems to us, is the
plain, obvious construction of the statute, when closely examined, and
harmonizes it with the nature of the proceeding and general object and
purpose of all such laws, and especially with £he whole purview of the
whole Act of 1867.
Such has been the almost uniform holding of all the courts before
which this question has come. They have uniformly, with but one
Pxception only which we have seen, in Connecticut, held that the
suthority to declare a discharge void in a state court, is incompatible
with the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal District Courts on this
subject, and we think on the soundest reasons. See Corey v. Rip-
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ley, 57 Maine 69; Oates's Adm'r v. Parish,47 Ala. 157. Mr. Bump,
in his work on Bankruptcy, p. 243, says this is the sounder view of the
question. He says: "the power conferred on the Court of Bankruptcy to annul a discharge is exclusive, and the discharge, like any other
judgment, cannot be impeached, when brought in question in a collateral
action by any party who has been properly notified of the pendency of
the proceedings in bankruptcy. The statute, it is true, declares in section 29 that the discharge, if granted, shall not be valid if the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which would constitute valid grounds
for withholding it; but this evidently contemplates the means tsubsequently provided for annulling it." If this were not so, he adds, "it
would be idle to summon creditors into a special court to set up objections which could be alleged and tried equally as well in any court.
There must, moreover, be an end of litigation, a time beyond which
contains facts cannot be contested. The necessity of meeting and contesting them in every court in which the discharge may be pleaded is
a hardship Congress never intended to impose upon the bankrupt, and
is, moreover, so flagrantly unjust and contrary to all the ordinary principles of jurisprudence, that nothing but the imperative demand of the
statute could justify or warrant such a construction." This view of -the
question is certainly one having great force of reason in it. In addition, we add other reasons, which we think strengthen this conclusion.
It seems to us that such a power would be inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction of the whole subject by the Federal government and
render such a discharge and decree of these courts, in many if not in
most cases a burden and a snare, rather than a relief to a debtor. He
goes into a court of exclusive jurisdiction and prosecutes his suit with
effect to a decree discharging him from his debt, but this only proves a
delusion in the construction contended for, by exposing him to have
the whole question of its validity to be retried at suit of any fretted
creditor, who may choose to harass a despised bankrupt, and thus, after
a solemn decree of this court, if he has a thousand creditors, each one
of them may sue him, and attack the validity of the decree, it may be
many years afterwards, when his witnesses are dead, or he dead, his
personal representative who knows nothing of the facts, be sued on the
ground that some article of property he was supposed to own was not
delivered up in his schedule or some one of the requirements of the
law not complied with, and this in the face of the decree of the court
adjudging that he had conformed to his duty in all the requirements of
the law at the time.
Again, he may have had the very grounds urged against his discharge
by one creditor then under the provision of the law, and the matter been
decided in his favor, or it may have been attempted to annul his discharge within the two years by another, and the court may have decided
in that issue again in his favor, yet in this view another creditor, who
had not chosen to prove his claim, might still require him to try the
same question over again. Further than this, his discharge may have
been, under this view of the law, contested and declared void by a state
court, within the two years, and yet on proceedings instituted under the
statute by other creditors in the district, having full jurisdiction over
the whole question, it may have been adjudged valid, and not subject
to be annulled for the causes stated. Which judgment is to be held correct, and which shall relieve him from his embarrassment? None can
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tell. 'In a word this view of the law enables the state courts, having no
jurisdiction over the original question, to practically nullify, if they
choose, the effect of the adjudication of the courts of the United States,
having exclusive jurisdiction over the whole subject, and as we have
said is incompatible with the powers granted to the Federal Government
to grant a discharge in bankruptcy, because it enables the courts of neal
forty states to nullify and render it inoperative. Truly, no such construction ought to be given to the Act of Congress unless its terms imperatively demanded it, and we think we have shown that they neither
demanded it, nor even fairly admitted of it, when fairly considered and
construed. This view of the question is in accordance with well settled
principles, applied in all other cases of construction of statutes. The
whole bankrupt proceeding is one under a statute of the United States.
The powers exercised and the remedies provided, in the language of
the Supreme Court of Maine in Corey v. Ripley, are given by the statute. The impeaching tribunal is specified by the statute, and its mode
of proceeding pointed out, and this designation, on well settled principles of interpretation, forms a part of the remedy and excludes all
others. For which the court cite numerous cases, which might be added
to indefinitely, if deemed necessary.
The case of Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 11, is a case precisely in
point, in which the authorities will be found collected, and the reasoning
given, and which settles the principles laid down beyond all dispute.
We therefore hold that the discharge granted by the District Court,
having jurisdiction over the person and estate of the bankrupt, is conelusive as a bar to all suits commenced in state courts, when interposed
by plea as provided in the statute, so far as any attack can be or shall
be attempted to be made, by alleging fraud in obtaining it, by withholding assets, or other cases specified in the statute, for which the
statute has provided the remedy by authorizing the discharge to be
annulled by the proceedings therein pointed 'out. We have twice before had occasion to examine this question, and have again given it a
careful review, because of its importance and the urgency of counsel :
and we feel no question as to the soundness of the conclusion at whicl
we have arrived. The result is that the Chancellor's decree on this
subject is correct and must be affirmed.
The earlier decisions upon the important question discussed in the foregoing
opinion were against the conclusiveness
of the discharge. In Beardsley v. Hall,
36 Conn. 270 (1869), it was held, without much discussion of principles or of
the details of the Bankrupt Act, that
the discharge could be attacked for fraud
in its procurement, in any court where
it was set up as a defence. To the same
effect are Perkins v. Gay, 3 Bank. Reg.
189 (1870), in the Superior Court of
Cincinnati, and Batchelder v. Law, 43
Vt. 662 (1871), in which case WH -LER,
J. delivered a strongly reasoned opinion,
taking the ground that where a debt had

been fraudulently omitted from the sche.
dule and the creditor thus prevented from
getting notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, he was a stranger to them and
not estopped from contesting the dlischarge.
The later and probably better opinion,
however, is in favor of the absolute conclusiveness of the discharge in all actions
except the direct proceeding to annul it,
given by the act: Corey v. Ripley, 57
le. 69 ; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Alcott, 46
N. Y. 12; Oates v. Parrish, 47 Aia.
157, and the unreported case of Parker
v. Atwood, ,in the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, ante, p. 530. J. T. M.
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Supreme Court of Vermont.
STATE OF VERMONT v. THOMAS PATTERSON.
It is not necessary in order to make dying declarations admissible in evidence,
that the declarant should state everything constituting the res gesto of the subject
of his statement, but only that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning as to such fact.
When the facts proved on the part of the prosecution show that the respondent
claimed to do the act resulting in death to the assailant in self-defence, the burden
of proof rests from the first upon the prosecutor to show beyond reasonable doubt
that the act was criminal.
It is error for the court to have any communication with the jury after a case
has been submitted to them, and while they have it under consideration, except in
open court.
It is also error for the court to furnish the jury a copy of the statutes of the
state while they are out of court deliberating upon their verdict, that they may
read certain provisions, designated by the court, touching the case under consideration.
The idea embraced in the expression that a man's house is his castle, is not that
it is his property, and that, as such, he has the right to defend and protect it by
other and more extreme means than he might lawfully use to defend and protect
his shop, his office or his barn. The sense in which the house has a peculiar immunity, is that it is sacred for the protection of his person and of his family. An
assault on the house can be regarded as an assault on the person only in case the
purpose of such assault be injury to the person of the occupant, or members of
his family, and in order to accomplish this, the assailant attacks the castle in order
to reach the inmate. In this view it is settled that, in sueb -ase, the inmate need
not flee from his house in order to escape injury by the assailant, but he may meet
him at the threshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means rendered
necessary by the exigency; and upon the same ground and reason that one may
defend himself from peril of life, or great bodily harm, by means fatal to the assailant, if rendered necessary by the exigency of the assault.
ON exceptions from the County Court of Franklin county. Defendant

was indicted for manslaughter. In May, 1871, the prisoner, nineteen
years of age, was living with his wife, mother and sister in a tenement
house in the village of St. Albans. After he had gone to bed, Flanders
and Watson, somewhat intoxicated, went to the house and rapped at the
door. Defendant raised a chamber window and asked them what they
wanted, and they said they wanted to come in. Talk went on between
them, respondent telling them they should not come in, and they insisting that they would, and growing more violent, using abusive epithets and swearing at him, and threatening to smash in the door. He
told them if they did not go away they would be made to go-they
replying that he could not scare them, and if he would come down they
would break in his head-and repeatedly threatening to smash in the
door. One of them threw a brick or stone through the window. One
started towards the door; whereupon the respondent went to another
room and got a gun which was loaded with shot, and put the barrel on
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the window-sill and fired, when Watson and Flanders ran away. Flan
ders died of wounds received from the shot.
The foregoing summary is what in substance the evidence on part
of the respondent tended to prove. Respoident testified that he fired
to the ground, and his object in firing was not to hit them but to scare
them away.
A witness for the prosecution, to prove, the dying declarations of
Flanders, testified that he saw him after he was shot; that in answer to
inquiries, he made statements concerning the occurrence connected with
the shooting; that he was so weak that witness could not get a full or
detailed statement of the affair from him; that he only got detached
statements in the intervals between spells of vomiting ; that he took
his words on paper at the time to preserve his dying statements, but the
paper was lost. To the allowance of this testimony exception was
taken. The witness testified that Flanders said that he and Watson
went to the front door of the house; he asked for admission to the
house; a man opened the window above and asked them what they
wanted; they said they wanted to get in; there were some words
passed; he didn't let them in and some words passed, and he, Flanders,
stepped back to where Watson was, and there was something said about
shooting by the party in the house; there was some reply on their part;
he didn't undertake to specify what it was; immediately thereafter the
gun was discharged; he, Flanders, left then; that is the substance of
all he said and very nearly the words he used.
The evidence on both sides was confined to the scene and occurrences
in which the homicide took place.
After the jury had retired, they sent the following inquiry in writing
to the court from their room by the officer who had them in charge:
"What is the law in relation to manslaughter in the third degree, or
what is the punishment for manslaughter in the third degree ?" and
the presiding judge of the court, while the court was in session, and the
jury were in their room for deliberation, without the knowled-e of the
respondent, or his counsel, or the counsel for the state, sent to the jury
in the room, and without bringing them into open court, the following
communication in writing:
"There are no degrees in manslaughter under our laws; but the
amount and kinds of punishment that shall be inflicted you will see is,
with certain limitations, in the discretion of!the court." And the court
sent the General Statutes to the jury in the room and referred them to
sect. 15, ch. 112.
This was made the subject of exception.
The foregoing is a sufficient statement to show the grounds of points
embraced in the felowing opinion; though many other points of exception were argued. Respondent was found guilty.
Farrington& Benton, for respondent.
Ballard& Wilson, for the State.
The opinibn of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-I.
It is objected in behalf of the respondent that the
dying declarations of Flanders, as testified by Mr. Hill, should have
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been excluded from the consideration of the jury, by force of the rule
as stated, 1 Greenl. Ev., § 159, viz: "Whatever the statement may be,
it must be complete in itself; for, if the declarations appear to have
been intended, by the dying man, to be connected with, and qualified
by, other statements, which he is prevented, by any cause, from making,
they will not be received." What we understand by the expression,
that the statement "must be complete in itself," is not, that the declarant
must state everything that constituted the res gestm of the subject of his
statement; but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning as
to such fact. This is plainly indicated by the closing part of the above
quotation, as to the declarations made being intended by the dying man
to be connected with and ualified by other statements, which he is
prevented from making. There is no indication in the testimony given
by Mr. Hill, that Flanders intended what he said to Hill should be
qualified by anything that he wished to say, and was prevented from
saying, or did not say. The fact that Mr. Hill had lost the paper con.
taining the declarations in writing, does not bear on the question. It may
have some bearing on the weight which ought to be accorded to the evidence thus given, as depending on the accuracy of his recollection, and
his correctness in repeating from memory what Flanders said to him.
But this, in that respect, is only the common case of comparative reliableness, as between the statement of facts orally from memory, and the
statement of them in written memoranda made at the time the facts occurred.
The fact that Flanders made his statement in intervals between
vomitings does not touch the question of the competency of the evidence, unless it should appear that, by such voinitings, he was prevented from expressing his meaning in relation to the facts he was
undertaking to state. By recurring to the testimony of Mr. Hill, given
in full in the leporter's minutes, it will be seen that the facts are few
and simple, about which the dying man undertook to speak; and there
is nothing in their nature that would seem to require anything more to
have been said in order to get the meaning he intended to convey in
respect to them. The manner and circumstances of the making of the
dying declarations are proper for consideration in giving effect to them
as evidence in the case-much the same as if the deposition of the dying
man had been taken, and given in evidence on the trial.
II. The court charged the jury that, "if they were convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the death of Flanders was occasioned by the
shot fired by the respondent, then the prosecution had made out the
killing in the manner charged in the indictment * * * that the killing
is presumed to be unlawful; and when the fact of killing is establishea
it devolves on the party who committed the act to excuse that killing;
to show that it was justified, in order to escape the legal consequences
which attach to the commission of the act." In this we think there is
error. As to the rule of presumption, as affecting the burden of proof.
as it is ordinarily found in the books on criminal law, especially the older
ones, it suffices to refer to the remarks of Ch. J. REDFIELD in State v.
McDonnell, 32 Vt. 538-9. Yet, with reference to that rule, as it was
applied in the present case, the statement of it in Foster's Or. Law
225, is worthy of notice. "In every charge of murd-er, the fact of
VOL.
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killing being first proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity or
infirmity, are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless theg
arise out of the evidence addvced against 4Iim; for the law presumeth
the fact to have been founded in malice, until the contrary appeareth."
In Roscoe, p. 20, that quotation is' preceded by this statement, viz :
" When a man commits an unlawful act, unaccompaniedby any circumstances justifying its commission, it is a presumption of law that he
acted advisedly, and with the intent to produce the consequences which
have ensued." In Yorke's Case, 9 Met. 91, the meaning of the rule is
peculiarly indicated by the manner in which Ch. J. SHAW stated it:
"that when the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing further is shown, the presumption of law is that it
was malicious, and an act of murder ;" that meaning is made palpable
and is illustrated by the same great judge in Hawkins's Case, 3 Gray
465, in which he says "that this was inapplicable to this (Hawkins's)
case, where the circumstances attending the homicide were fully shown
by the evidence." And on this point he instructed the jury that "the
murder charged must be proved; the burden of proof is on the commonwealth to prove the case; all the evidence on both sides, which the
jury find true, is to be taken into consideration ; and if, the homicide
being conceded, no excuse or justification is shown, it is either murder
or manslaughter; and if the jury upon all the circumstances are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was done with malice, they will
return a verdict of murder; otherwise they will fitd the defendant
guilty of manslaughter."
In MeKie's Case, 1 Gray 61, on an indictment for assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon, the subject of the burden of proof in that
class of offences, was fully considered by the court, and instructively
discussed by BiGELOW, J., in the opinion of the court drawn up by him.
He says: ," It appears that the justification on which the defendant
relied, was disclosed partly by the testimony introduced by the government, and in part by evidence offered by the defendant; and that it
related to, and grew out of the transaction or res gestm which constituted
the alleged criminal act." The result is stated thus: "But in cases
like the present, * * * where the defendant sets up no separate independent fact in answer to the criminal charge, but confines his defence
to the original transaction charged as criminal, with its accompanying
circumstances, the burden of proof does not change, but remains upon
the government to satisfy the jury that the act was unjustifiable and
unlawful." Preceding this extract it is said, " Even in the case of
homicide, where a stricter rule has been .held as to the burden of proof
than in other criminal cases, upon peculiar reasons applicable to that
(ffence alone, it is conceded that the burden is not shifted by proof of a
voluntary killing, when there is excuse or justification apparent on the
proof offered in support of the prosecution, or arising out of the circumstanees attending the homicide."
Citing York's Case, supra, and
l'bster's Case, 5 Cush. 305.
We adopt the views thus shown, in their application to the present
case, so far as to hold that with reference to the state of the evidence
given on the trial, the jury should not have been instructed as they
were in thE parts of the charges above recited; but should have been
instrueted ia substance that upon all the evidence they must find beyond
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a reasonable doubt that the crime charged in the indictment was corn.
nitted by the respondent, in order to warrant his being found guilty,
with proper adaptations of the instruction to this feature of the case as
presented-in the course and manner of the trial.
III. The exception to the communication of the presiding judge
with the jury is maintained. The prev4iling idea in this state has
been that all communications between judge and jury after a case has
been submitted to the jury, and while they have it in consideration
should be in open court, and, so far as we know, the practice has been
conformable to this idea. In Sargent v. Roberts et al., 1 Pick. 242,
Oh. J. PARKER says: "We are all of opinion, after considering the
question maturely, that no communication whatever ought to take place
between the judge and jury, after the cause has been committed to them
by the charge of the judge, unless in open court, and when practicable,
in presence of the counsel in the cause." See Taylor t. Betsford, I3
Johns. 487. As to furnishing the jury with a copy of the statutes, we
regard the rule to be equally distinct and decisive, not only in this state
but elsewhere: Burrows v. Unwin, 3 Car. & P. 310. In errill v.
Nary, 10 Allen 416, a copy of the statutes was carried to the jury at
their request and with the consent of the judge. This was held to be
improper; and the proper views applicable to the subject are so amply
set forth in the opinion delivered by Oh. J. BIGELOW, as to render it
needless to do more than refer to that opinion.
IV. It is not deemed needful for the purposes of this case, with
reference to its future prosecution, to discuss specifically any other
subject, except that of the dwelling-house being one's castle, as bearing
on his right to kill, or to use deadly weapons in defence of it. This is
presented in the third request for a charge in behdlf of the respondent
which is in the language used by HOLROYD, J., in charging the jury in
.Meade's Case (infra), viz., that "the making of an attack upon a
dwelling, and especially in the night, the law regards as equivalent to
an assault on a man's person, for a man's house is his castle." The
purpose of this request seems to have been to justify the killing with a
gun as a lawful mode and means of defending the castle, as well as the
person within it. Looking at the state of the evidence, itis not altogether
obvious what there was in the case to warrant its being claimed that the
respondent killed Flanders as a means of defending himself or his
castle. It was claimed in behalf of the prosecution, and the evidence
in that behalf tended to show that the gun was not fired at Flanders as
a measure of force to repel and prevent him from breaking into the
house. Moreover, in the exceptions it is said: "The respondent testified that he fired to the ground, and the object in firing was not to hit
them, but to scare them away." The respondent seems not to have
regarded it as a case or a conjuncture in which it was needful or expedient
to use a deadly weapon as a means of forceful resistance to meet and
repel an assault on his house-whatever such assault in fact was-or to
protect himself from any threatened or feared assault on his person.
The gun loaded with powder alone would have served all the needs of
the occasion, and of the exigency which he supposed then to exist and
to press upon him. Nevertheless the point was made by said third request. It is indicated in the charge that the case, State v. Hooker, 17
Vt. 670, was invoked in support of it, and it is cited in this court
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for the same purpose. That case professes to decide only the questicn
involved in and presented by it, viz., whether it was criminal, under
the statute, for the respondent to resist an officer in the service of civil
process within his dwelling-house-such officer having unlawfully
broken into the house for the purpose of making such service. The
language of the opinion is to be interpreted with reference to the case
and the question. That case, in no respect involved the subject of the
use of a deadly weapon with fatal effect in defence of the castle; and
it is not to be supposed that the judge who drew up the opinion was
undertaking to discuss or propound the law of that subject.
To come, then, to the subject as it is involved in said third request:
In Foster's Crown Law 319, it is said: "The books say that a man's
house is his castle for safety and repose to himself and family." In
a-o7o's Case, Oro. Car. 537, an officer, with a capias ad satisfaciendum,
went with other officers for the purpose of executing the same, to the
dwelling-house of the respondent, and, finding him within, demanded
of him to open the door and suffer them to enter. He commanded
them to depart, telling them they should not enter. Thereupon they
broke a window, and afterwards went to the door of the house and
offered to force it open, and broke one of ithe hinges. Whereupon Cook
discharged his musket at the deceased and hit him, and he died of the
wound. "After argument at the bar, all the justices, seriatim, delivered their opinions that it was not murder but manslaughter; the bailiff
was slain in doing an unlawful act in seeking to break open the house
to execute process for a subject; and every one is to defend his own
house. Yet they all held it was manslaughter; for he might have
resisted him without killing him, and when he saw and shot voluntarily
at him it was manslaughter." This was one of the earliest cases, and
was fully considered, and it has been cited in all the books on criminal
law since its decision in 1640, 15 Car. 1, with some incorrectness of
statement in 1 Hale's Pl. Cr. 458, and in other books adopting his text.
This is in some measure rectified by a remark in I East's P. C. 321,
322. See also Roscoe's Cr. Ev. '758; also 1 Bishop's Cr. L. note 2,
§ 858, 5th ed.
It is to be specially noticed that, what made it manslaughter was, that,
in order to defend his castle, it was not necessary to kill the bailiff.
The same idea of necessity, in order to relieve the killing from being
manslaughter, exists in the case of defending one's person, as stated in
Hawkins' P. 0. 113. "Homicide se defendendo seems to be where one
who has no other possible means of preserving his life from one who
combats him on a sudden quarrel, or of defending his person from one
who attempts to beat him (especially if such attempt be made upon him
in his own house), kills the person by whom he is reduced to such inevitable necessity." In a learned note in 2 Arch. Cr. L. 225, it is said,
"But when it is said that a man may rightfully use as much force as is
necessary for the protection of his person and property, it should be
recollected that this rule is subject to this most important modification; that he shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life or
great bodily harm. * ' * You can only kill to save life or limb, or prevent a great crime, or to accomplish a necessary public duty. It is
therefore clear, that, if one man deliberately kills another to prevent a
mere trespass on his property, whether that trespass could or could not
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otherwise be prevented, he is guilty of murder. If, indeed, he had at
first used moderate force, and this had been returned with such violence
that his own life was endangered, and then he had killed from necessity,
it would have been excusable homicide. Not because he could take life
to save his property, but he might take the life of the assailant to save
his own."
Harcour's Case, 5 Eliz. stated in 1 Hale's P. C. 485-6, shows tuat this
doctrine is not new. "Harcourt being in possession of a house by title,
as it seems, A. endeavored to enter, and shot an arrow at them within
the house; and Harcourt from within shot an arrow at those that would
have entered, and killed one of the company, this was ruled manslaughter, and it was not se defendendo, because there was no danger of his
life from them without." What was thus ruled is the key to the author's
meaning in the next following paragraph of his book, which see.
The idea that is embodied in the expression, that a man's house is his
castle, is not that it is his property, and, as such, he has 'the right to
defend and protect it by other and more extreme means than he might
lawfully use to defend and protect his shop, his office or his barn. The
sense in which the house has a peculiar immunity is, that it is sacred
for the protection of his person and of his family. An assault on the
house can be regarded as an assault on the person, only in case the purpose of such assault be injury to the person of the occupant or members of his family, and to accomplish this, the assailant attacks the
castle in order to reach the inmate. In this view it is said and settled,
that, in such case, the inmate need not flee from his house, in order to
escape from being injured by the assailant, but he may meet him at the
threshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means rendered
necessary by the exigency; and upon the same ground and reason as
one may defend himself from peril of life, or great bodily harm, by
means fatal to the assailant if rendered necessary by the exigency of the
assault.
This is the meaning of what was said by HOLROYD, J., in charging
the jury in .Aeade's Case, 1 Lewin 0. 0. 184. Some exasperated sailors
had ducked Meade, and wore in the act of throwing him into the sea,
when he was rescued by the police. As the gang were leaving, they
threatened that they would come by night and pull his house down. In
the middle of the night a great number came, making menacing demonstrations. Meade, under an apprehension, as he alleged, that his life and
property were in danger, fired a pistol, by which one of the party was
killed. Meade was indicted for murder. Upon that state of facts and
evidence, the judge said to the jury : ", A civil trespass will not excuse the
firing of a pistol at a.trespasser in sudden resentment or anger, &c. * * *
But a man is not authorized to fire a pistol on every intrusion or invasion
of his house. He ought, if he has reasonable opportunity, to endeavor
to remove him without having recourse to the last extremity. But the
making an attack upon a dwelling-house, and especially at night, the
law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person ; for a man's
house is his castle, and, therefore, in the eye of the law it is equivalent
to an assault; but no words or singing are equivalent to an assault, nor
will they authorize an assault in return, &c. * * * There are cases where
a person in heat of blood kills another, that the law does not deem it
murder, but lowers the offence to manslaughter, as where a party coming
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up by way of making an attack, and without there being any previous
apprehension of danger, the party attacked, instead of having recourse
to a more reasonable.and less violent modelof averting it, having an op.
portunity so to do, fires on the impulse of the moment. In the present
case, if you are of opinion that the prisoner was really attacked, and that
the party were on the point of breaking in, or likely to do so, and execute the threats of the day before, he perhaps was justified in firing as
he did; if you are of opinion that he intended to fire over and frighten,
then the case is one of manslaughter, and not of self-defence."
The sense in which one's house is his castle, and he may defend himself within it, is shown by what is said in 1 Hale's P1. Cr. 486, that,
" in case he is assaulted in his own house, he need not flee as far as he
can, as in other cases of se defendendo, for:he hath the protection of his
house to excuse him from flying, as that would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by flight."
Now set over against this what is said in 1 Russell 662, and the true
distinction between the house asproperty,on the one hand, and as castle
for protection, on the other, is very palpable, viz.: "If A., in defence
of his house, kill B., a trespasser, who endeavors to make an entry upon
it, it is at least common manslaughter, unless indeed there were danger
of life." P. 663. "But where the trespass is barely against the property of another, the law does not admit the force of the provocation as
sufficient to warrant the owner in making use of a dangerous or deadly
weapon ; more particularly if such violence is used after the party has
desisted from the trespass." In Carrol v. The State, 24 Ala. 36,
it is said, "the owner may resist the entry into his house, but he has
no right to kill, unless it be rendered necessary in order to prevent a
felonious destruction of his property, or to defend himself against loss
of life, or great bodily harm." Cited in 2 Bishop Cr. L. § 707, 5th ed.
That case impresses us differently from what it does the learned author,
as indicated by his remark prefacing the citation.
As developing and illustrating the prevailing idea of the law as to
what will justify homicide se et sua defendendo, it is not without interest
upon the point now under consideration to advert to what is said upon
the general subject. In 'McNally 562, it is said, ' the injured party
may repel force by force, in defence of his person, habitation, property,
against one who manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth by violence or
surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases lie is
not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he fiudeth hinself out of danger, and if, in such conflict, he happeneth to kill, such
killing is justifiable." Wharton incorporates this into his work as text.
The same is found in the older books: I1 Hale's P1. Cr. 485-6 ; also in
Foster's Crown Law 273, 1 Russell 667, and in other books ad lib. But
to apprehend this in its true scope and application, it is important to
have in mind what is said in 1 Russell 668 : "The rule clearly extends
only to cases of felony : for if one come to beat another, or take his
goods merely as a trespasser, though the owner may justify the beating
of him so far as to make him desist, yet, if he kill him. it is manslaughter."
* * * No assault however violent will ftstify killing the assailant, under
a plea of necessity, unless there be a manifestation of felonious intent."
See Archbold Cr. L. 221, cited 9 C. & P. 22.
This covers the cases of statutory justification of homicide, both under
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our own and the English statutes ; and in principle, and in reason, it is
in keeping with the common law as to se defendendo; in defining the
scope of which, in this respect, it is well laid down that, " before a person can avail himself of the defence, that he used a weapon in defence
of his life, it must appear that that defence was necessary to protect
his own life, or to protect himself from such serious bodily harm as
would give him reasonable apprehension that his life was in immediate
danger :"I Russell 661.
The law of the subject, as given in thebooks thus cited and referred
to, seems to have been adequately apprehended by the court, and, so far
,s we can judge from what is shown by the record before us, it was not
administered erroneously or improperly in the .trial as against the respondent. If it were to be assumed that the defence might legitimately
claim that there was an assault on the house, with the intent either of
taking the life of the respondent or doing to him great bodily harm, the
respondent would be justified in using a deadly weapon, if it should be
necessary in order to prevent the perpetration of such crime, or if,
under existing circumstances attending the emergency, the respondent
had reason to believe, and was warranted in believing, and in fact did
believe, that it was necessary, in order to prevent the commission of
such crime. In case the purpose of the assailant was to take life, or to
inflict great bodily harm, and the object of his attack (if there was
such attack), upon the house was to get access to the inmate occupying
the same, for such purpose, the same means might lawfully be used to
prevent him from breaking in, as might be used to prevent him from
making the harmful assault upon the person, in case the parties were
met face to face in any other place. In either case the point of justification is, that such use of fatal means was necessary in order to the
rightful effectual protection of the respondent, or -his family, from the
threatened or impending peril:
We have been led to this discussion and exposition of the law as to
the defence of the dwelling-house, on account of the somewhat fragmentary and disjointed condition in which it is done up in the books
and cases of criminal law, and for the purpose of rendering as explicit
as we are able the views of this court on that subject, as it has been
brought into question and debate in the case in hand.
In this exposition, and in the views embodied in this opinion, all the
members of the court concur.
The verdict is set aside and new trial granted.
We have no purpose of attempting to
enlarge upon the legal discussion in the
foregoing opinion, NAich seems to us
altogether satisfactory, and will commend itself to the acceptance of the profes-ion, as stating many nice and sometimes embarrassing questions, with great
clearness and truth. There are one or
two matters connected with the general
taste of the times, affecting these questions. that we shall venture to advert to.
The demand of the jury for further in-

structions by way of correspondence and
the opportunity to discuss the statutes in
their. consultation-room, is something
akin to many other things which have
crept into jury trials with telegraphs
and high schools and competitive examinations. It seems to be supposed by
some, that those jurors, who come into
the seats with their kid gloves on, and
who occupy themselves, during the trial,
in taking notes of the testimony, have
made jury trials quite another thing from

